Words, Thoughts, and Theories - Revision history

Robert.adlington: /* 8. The Darwinian Conclusion */

2026-10-12T16:11:28Z

8. The Darwinian Conclusion

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:11, 12 October 2026
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	== 8. The Darwinian Conclusion ==		== 8. The Darwinian Conclusion ==

			* Quine's "web of belief" - a set of interconnected conceptual strands. The peripheral strands are the beliefs that are most easily influenced by the outside world, while the central strands are beliefs, like our fundamental beliefs about space and time, that seem relatively immune from such influences. Quine's point is that even the most central strands of the web are ultimately subject to modification by vibrations at the periphery.
			* Everyday cognition is simply the theory that most of us most of the time have arrived at when we get too old and stupid to do more theorizing.
			* At least a large part of our ordinary knowledge of the world has no particular privileged set of representations and rules. Rather, it is the product of a system of theory formation and revision that restructures the very nature of the representational system. this system alters the very relations between representations and input as it gets more input and constructs more representations.
			* We see the system at work most dramatically in childhood and in our endeavors as scientists, but there is no reason to suppose that it is not equally responsible for much of our everyday cognition. On this view, the real explanatory action in cognitive science lies in trying to describe the dynamic mechanisms responsible for conceptual change, as much as in trying to describe our static conceptual structures.
			* The theory theory might turn explanation in cognitive science on its head. Conceptual change, rather than being a mysterious extra problem, would be a fundamental explanatory mechanism for important areas of cognition. The actual representational system we have at any given moment is only a fortuitous subset of the possible representational systems we could construct.
			* On this view, all of cognitive science would be developmental.
			* The theory theory implies a computational system that combines the capacity for learning and qualitative change of connectionism with the structure and systematicity of classical implementations.
			* The theory theory propose that there is elaborate, rich, representational structure form birth. We also propose that there are more powerful mechanisms of theory change initially in place than Piaget originally supposed. Our theory does not predict domain-general logical stage changes of the sort that Piaget proposed. Rather, it holds that the child accumulates theories of particular domains and the structure of those theories allows inferences in those domains.
			* Unlike Piaget, we do not proposed that action is the central motor in cognitive development. Finally, we propose a rich and powerful causal role for linguistic input. We propose that language change may often lead to conceptual change rather than vice versa. In all these respects, our theory is v ery different from, indeed, stands in opposition to Piaget's.

Robert.adlington: /* 7. Language and Thought */

2026-10-12T13:34:26Z

7. Language and Thought

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 * For adults, it is part of our deepest conviction that all natural kinds belong in some category or other. Chemistry or biology can be seen as an attempt to specify the natural kind of everything.
 * At 18 months, children suddenly produce a large number of new names - the "naming insight", "vocabulary spurt", or "naming explosion. Any increase in vocabulary at this point is almost entirely of object names and an obsession with naming. They also start to show evidence of "mutual exclusivity", "lexical gap filling", or the "new name, new category" principle.
-* We might say that the ontological and semantic parts of the Putnam framework are discovered at the same, with the child's exhaustive sorting behavior showing that she thinks every object kind should go in a particular spatial location and have a name
+* We might say that the ontological and semantic parts of the Putnam framework are discovered at the same, with the child's exhaustive sorting behavior showing that she thinks every object kind should go in a particular spatial location and have a name.
 = III: Theories and Language =
 == 7. Language and Thought ==
 == 8. The Darwinian Conclusion ==

Robert.adlington: /* 6. The Child's Theory of Kinds */

2026-10-12T11:13:56Z

6. The Child's Theory of Kinds

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 == 6. The Child's Theory of Kinds ==
 = III: Theories and Language =
 == 7. Language and Thought ==
 == 8. The Darwinian Conclusion ==

Robert.adlington at 15:21, 8 October 2026

2026-10-08T15:21:16Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:21, 8 October 2026
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	* Infants begin by making overly general predictions about the connections between actions and events, but then begin to realize that only some subclasses of relations between actions and events are actually reliable over the long run.		* Infants begin by making overly general predictions about the connections between actions and events, but then begin to realize that only some subclasses of relations between actions and events are actually reliable over the long run.
	* Around 9 months, children will being only to attempt solutions that obey the rules of spatial contact. This enables their problem solving to be both more constrained, since a wide array of actions are ruled out, and more general at the same time. They can see a new problem, like obtaining an object by pulling at the end of a horizontal string, and immediatley hit on one of several appropriate solutions.		* Around 9 months, children will being only to attempt solutions that obey the rules of spatial contact. This enables their problem solving to be both more constrained, since a wide array of actions are ruled out, and more general at the same time. They can see a new problem, like obtaining an object by pulling at the end of a horizontal string, and immediatley hit on one of several appropriate solutions.
			* Action at a distance is the rule rather than the exception in psychological causality. We influence others by talking pointing, gesturing, and generally communicating. Only in the most extreme situations would we attempt to causally affect others by direct spatial contact.
			* Choosing our clothes, preparing food and communicating are all ways of influencing other people, and more effective that lifting or pushing them.
			* As soon as the infant shows an understanding of his own causal relations to objects and persons, he apparently assumes that other people's causal relations to objects and persons are similar.
			* By 18 months infants will test interpersonal relations by setting up situations in which their own desires conflict with those of others and explore the consequences of those conflicts. This experimentation is the basis of the "terrible twos".
			* Like scientists, babies sometimes prefer truth to love.
			* Failure and success words - "uh-oh", "no", "there", done it" appear around 18 months and are often used not to express disappointment but when the child is deliberately failing.
			* "No" signals the beginning of the terrible twos, as the child learns to wield this word.
			* At around 21-24 months children start to use the word "want" to talk about their desires

	== 6. The Child's Theory of Kinds ==		== 6. The Child's Theory of Kinds ==

Robert.adlington: /* 5. The Child's Theory of Actions */

2026-10-03T09:36:19Z

5. The Child's Theory of Actions

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 == 5. The Child's Theory of Actions ==
 == 6. The Child's Theory of Kinds ==
 = III: Theories and Language =
 == 7. Language and Thought ==
 == 8. The Darwinian Conclusion ==

Robert.adlington: /* II: Evidence for the Theory Theory */

2026-10-02T15:23:03Z

II: Evidence for the Theory Theory

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 = II: Evidence for the Theory Theory =
 == 4. The Child's Theory of Appearances ==
 == 5. The Child's Theory of Actions ==
 == 6. The Child's Theory of Kinds ==

Robert.adlington: /* 3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations */

2026-09-27T21:26:03Z

3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:26, 27 September 2026
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	* We want to argue for a kind of developmental pluralism: there are many quite different mechanisms underlying cognitive developments, and theory formation is an important one of them.		* We want to argue for a kind of developmental pluralism: there are many quite different mechanisms underlying cognitive developments, and theory formation is an important one of them.

	* According to modularity theories, representations of the world are not constructed from evidence in the course of development. Instead, representations are produced by innate structures, modules, or constraints that have been constructed in the course of evolution. These structures may need to be triggered, but one they are triggered, they create mandatory representations of input		* According to modularity theories, representations of the world are not constructed from evidence in the course of development. Instead, representations are produced by innate structures, modules, or constraints that have been constructed in the course of evolution. These structures may need to be triggered, but one they are triggered, they create mandatory representations of input
	* On the starting-state view, the child is innately endowed with a particular set of representations of input and rules operating on the representations. According to this view, such initial structures, while innate, would be defeasible; any part of them could be, and indeed will be, altered by new evidence. We propose that there are innate theories that are later modified and revised. The process of theory change and replacement begins at birth.		* On the starting-state view, the child is innately endowed with a particular set of representations of input and rules operating on the representations. According to this view, such initial structures, while innate, would be defeasible; any part of them could be, and indeed will be, altered by new evidence. We propose that there are innate theories that are later modified and revised. The process of theory change and replacement begins at birth.
	* Certainly, this type of account seems more tractable than one in which theory-like conceptual structures are constructed from scratch from a disorganized flow of experience.		* Certainly, this type of account seems more tractable than one in which theory-like conceptual structures are constructed from scratch from a disorganized flow of experience.
	* Modularity nativism, on the other hand, implies a much stronger set of claims. For Fodor, for example, modules are not only innate; they are also encapsulated and the representations that are the outcome of modules cannot be overturned by new patterns of evidence.		* Modularity nativism, on the other hand, implies a much stronger set of claims. For Fodor, for example, modules are not only innate; they are also encapsulated and the representations that are the outcome of modules cannot be overturned by new patterns of evidence.
	* At least some of the structural and functional features of theories - their abstractness, coherence, and predictive and interpretive force - can also be found in modules.		* At least some of the structural and functional features of theories - their abstractness, coherence, and predictive and interpretive force - can also be found in modules.
			* According to the theory theory, input is evidence. It radically alters the nature of theoretical concepts.
			* A theorizing mechanism is a representational system that reorganizes itself in response to input. It is an inherently developmental system. This leads to a distinctive set of developmental predictions. The theory theory predicts a succession of different theories, each replacing the earlier theory
			* Modular representations do not lead to predictions through some set of inductive or deductive generalizations or through a process of theory testing, confirmation and disconfirmation. They lead to predictions because they are specifically designed by evolution to do so.

			* Some theories in cognitive science have proposed that knowledge consists of empirical generalizations. "Scripts" are an example.
			* Like theories, but unlike modules, empirical generalizations, scripts, narratives, and nets are defeasible.
			* When we want deeper explanatory adequacy or wider predictive power, we turn from scripts to theories, even when we are talking about restaurants.
			* Modules must help to provide the input to theorizing processes. On any view, there are encapsulated atheoretical processes that take us from patterns of stimulation at the retina to patterns of representation in the visual cortex.
			* How far up, as it were, do these modular process go? Where is the border between modules and theories, between the periphery and the center?
			* A lesson of the cognitive revolution is that phenomenology does not, in general, recapitulate epistemology. On this view, many representations that are theoretical, in the sense of being revisable and defeasible in theory-like ways, might have much of the direct, vivid phenomenology of perception.
			* Empirical generalizations often seem to play a crucial role in theory change. Almost by definition, they are the kind of knowledge that provides us with counter-evidence to the predictions of the theory.
			* On our view, modules, theories, and empirical generalizations are all in play literally from birth. Innate theories will assign powerful, abstract, and predictive representations to the outputs of modules. New information coming into the cognitive system will be represented in terms of these theories. Some relations among the inputs will not, however, be predicted by the theories; they will constitute empirical generalizations. Eventually, some of these kinds of inputs will lead to a revision of the theory, the modular outputs will be assigned new representations by the new theory, and so on.
			* In the same way that technological advances enable or facilitate change in science, so information processing advances might enable or facilitate theory change in children.
			* The most significant alternative to modularity accounts in syntactic development is not the theory theory but rather various functionalist theories that emphasize the role of social interaction in language acquisition. Assimilating all cognitive development to the model of socialization is, however, a dreadful mistake.

	= II: Evidence for the Theory Theory =		= II: Evidence for the Theory Theory =

Robert.adlington: /* 3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations */

2026-09-27T10:36:57Z

3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:36, 27 September 2026
Line 53:		Line 53:

	== 3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations ==		== 3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations ==

			* We want to argue for a kind of developmental pluralism: there are many quite different mechanisms underlying cognitive developments, and theory formation is an important one of them.
			* According to modularity theories, representations of the world are not constructed from evidence in the course of development. Instead, representations are produced by innate structures, modules, or constraints that have been constructed in the course of evolution. These structures may need to be triggered, but one they are triggered, they create mandatory representations of input
			* On the starting-state view, the child is innately endowed with a particular set of representations of input and rules operating on the representations. According to this view, such initial structures, while innate, would be defeasible; any part of them could be, and indeed will be, altered by new evidence. We propose that there are innate theories that are later modified and revised. The process of theory change and replacement begins at birth.
			* Certainly, this type of account seems more tractable than one in which theory-like conceptual structures are constructed from scratch from a disorganized flow of experience.
			* Modularity nativism, on the other hand, implies a much stronger set of claims. For Fodor, for example, modules are not only innate; they are also encapsulated and the representations that are the outcome of modules cannot be overturned by new patterns of evidence.
			* At least some of the structural and functional features of theories - their abstractness, coherence, and predictive and interpretive force - can also be found in modules.

	= II: Evidence for the Theory Theory =		= II: Evidence for the Theory Theory =
	== 4. The Child's Theory of Appearances ==		== 4. The Child's Theory of Appearances ==

Robert.adlington at 10:27, 27 September 2026

2026-09-27T10:27:52Z

@@ Line 41: / Line 41: @@
 ** Tycho Brahe's account acknowledges many of the flaws of the Ptolemaic accounts and uses the ides of heliocentrism to deal with them, but fails to accept the central idea that the earth itself goes around the sun.
 ** Only with Kepler is there a really coherent heliocentric account that deals both with the anomalies and with the earlier data itself. And while, strictly speaking, experimentation on the heavenly bodies was impossible, periods of intense and detailed observation in this transitional period provided a far richer empirical base than had been available before.
 == 3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations ==

Robert.adlington: /* 2. The Scientist as Child */

2026-09-26T09:41:04Z

2. The Scientist as Child

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 * Quite typically, underlying any human cognitive activity is an abstract structure that is not at all apparent in superficial phenomenology or practice.
 * From an evolutionary point of view, three of the most distinctive features of human beings are their long, protected immaturity, the plasticity of their behavior, and their ability to adapt to an extremely wide variety of environments. Equipping human children with particularly powerful and flexible cognitive devices might be an important part of this picture. Indeed, we might think of childhood as a period when many of the requirements for survival are suspended so that children can concentrate on acquiring a veridical picture of the particular physical and social world in which they find themselves.
 == 3. Theories, Modules, and Empirical Generalizations ==